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Programmers’ lack of knowledge and ability in secure 
development threatens everyone who uses mobile apps. There’s 
no consensus on how to empower app programmers to get that 
knowledge. Based on interviews with twelve industry experts we 
argue that the discipline of secure app development is still at an 
early stage. Only once industry and academia have produced 
effective app developer motivation and training approaches shall 
we begin to see the kinds of secure apps we need to combat crime 
and privacy invasions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The past ten years has seen a massive growth in the creation and 
usage of mobile phone and tablet apps. Increasingly those apps 
are handling sensitive information about us: controlling our 
financial transactions, enabling our personal communication and 
social networking and holding the intimate details of our lives. So 
the security of those apps is becoming increasingly vital.  
In this context, it’s disturbing to find that some 73% of US app 
development professionals, interviewed in a recent IBM-
sponsored survey [16], believe that developer lack of knowledge 
of secure coding practice is a major concern. Analysis of existing 
apps also gives us reason for disquiet. Enck et al [7] analyzed 
some 1100 commercial Android apps in 2011 and  found privacy 
issues in a majority of them . Bluebox, an app security solution 
provider, analyzed the top five payment apps in 2015 [2] and 
found both vulnerabilities permitting financial theft and privacy 
issues in all of them. 
Virtually all of the vulnerabilities reported in these papers were 
due to choices by the programmers developing the apps; they 
could have made choices that didn’t lead to the issues. Thus the 
security of users and data depends vitally on programmers’ 
security practices. 
So it’s important to improve the effectiveness of developers at 
producing secure apps. There are three research questions that 
address this effectiveness, all worthwhile:  
(1) What kinds of security errors do programmers make?  
(2) How do we improve the systems and compilers that support 
the developers in their work; and  
(3) How can we improve the security skills of the app developers 
themselves?  
There has been a good deal of work on the first question such as 
the previously-mentioned work by Enck and Bluebox, or work by 
Xie et al [20] exploring the reasons why programmers make 
security errors. Various projects – including Xie et al’s IDE 
enhancements [19], compiler improvements and libFuzzer’s 
testing support [13] – address the second question. Taking the 
third question, however, there is little understanding how and why 
app programmers learn security and what approaches are likely to 
work best. This work starts to address that gap. 
This paper draws on an ongoing project exploring how app 
programmers learn security. We suggest a simple model of the 
motivations of an app programmer, and explore how different 
experts’ approaches relate to that model. We explore the aspects 
of app security that were accepted by all the experts; and highlight 
some of the differences. 
Based on this exploration, we argue that app security is still at an 
early stage. This has significant implications for potential 
implementers. In particular they have choices to make about what 
aspects of app security and secure processes are appropriate to 
their projects, and these decisions are not yet codified in an 
industrywide shared understanding. 
2. BACKGROUND  
We found little existing work about how programmers learn 
application security. There is a selection of books and papers 
aiming to provide the information the programmers need to know. 
Examples include the ‘security patterns’ movement of the early 
2000’s such as ‘Security Patterns…’ by Schumacher+ [17], which 
provides a range of information from abstract process to detailed 
implementation. More recent books are Gary McGraw’s 
‘Software Security’ [14], which provides a process-based 
approach; or Howard, LeBlanc and Viega’s  ‘24 Deadly Sins of 
Software Security’ [11], which concentrates on classic 
programmer security errors. More popular with programmers1 are 
                                                                    
1 Based on Amazon.com book rankings at March 2016. 
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books targeted specifically at particular platforms, such as 
Application Security for the Android Platform [18] or Learning 
iOS Security [1], both of which restrict themselves to exploring 
the security features of each respective platform.  
Other effective learning resources include Microsoft’s classic 
application developer website on application security [15], which 
has everything from the Microsoft Security Development 
Lifecycle to details about the security use of specific Microsoft 
tools and environments; and the OWASP community-written 
‘Developer Guide’ [21], providing a more general app-specific 
guide to security issues. 
However we found relatively little literature on how programmers 
learn and nothing specific to app programmers. Johnson and 
Senges [12] studied how programmers learned to function in a 
complicated organization, Google. They concluded that the 
majority of programmer learning there was peer learning, 
facilitated by strong corporate standards and culture. Other studies 
have incorporated the concepts of programmer learning into the 
wider term of Software Process Improvement (SPI). So for 
example a study by Dyba [6] examines learning as one aspect of 
SPI, differentiating Exploitation, the dissemination of existing 
knowledge, from Exploration, the gaining of new knowledge; it 
concludes that both have a positive effect on productivity but 
doesn’t explore mechanisms. 
A little-known work by Enes [8] used interviews to discover how 
professionals, including programmers, acquire their expert 
knowledge. It concludes that the preferred learning mechanisms 
are all informal ones: especially on-the job training and personal 
interaction. It also highlights, as an important factor, professional 
pride in having ‘expert areas’ of competence. 
In the context of learning about software security, a particularly 
important finding is that of Conradi and Dyba  [4]. This identifies 
that programmers had difficulty with, and resisted, learning from 
the output of process improvers, and particularly from formal 
written routines. This suggests an ‘impedance mismatch’ between 
those who write instructions and processes for developers, and the 
developers themselves who are expected to carry them out. We 
can speculate that security experts tend to think in terms of 
complete lists of issues and ways to break software; developers 
think in terms of simplest and quickest ways to create desired 
functionality.  
3. OUR RESEARCH 
The purpose of our research was to provide ways to improve app 
software development, motivated by personal observation that app 
security was difficult to learn. So our approach to this research 
was pragmatic. We used aspects of different methodological 
approaches to get the most effective results.  
Our method was to interview experts in app security. We used 
semi-structured interviews with app development specialists, and 
analyzed them using Grounded Theory [3,9].  
We had observed that much of the research and thinking in 
security appears negative from the point of view of an app 
developer: criticisms of existing software; penetration testing; 
analysis of exploits. In the context of the ‘impedance mismatch’, 
we were looking instead for positive approaches to security 
learning. Thus the nature of the questions and the thrust of the 
analysis were guided by a further research method, Appreciative 
Inquiry [5]. This led our emphasis in the interviews to be the 
positive techniques the experts had discovered or used, and where 
and why those were particularly successful. 
We chose our interviewees opportunistically, mainly through 
introductions from former colleagues. Time and practicality 
limited the number of interviews to a dozen. Guest [10] suggests 
that further interviews would be unlikely to generate much in the 
way of further new theory. In practice we believe that we have 
probably reached this ‘theoretical saturation point’ with respect to 
app security techniques (Section 7), but not with respect to the 
contrasts among experts (Sections 5 and 6) 
Table 1: The experts interviewed 
ID Organisation type Typical role 
P1 Bespoke app developer Developing apps for business clients; author on app security 
P2 Mobile phone manufacturer Leader of large team specialising in security 
P3 Operating system supplier Developer of user-facing web services 
P4 Smart card specialists Design and implementation of smart card software 
P5 Security-related SaS supplier Architecting and promoting a secure service 
P6 Promoting industry App security consultancy 
P7 Mobile phone manufacturer Developer and software architect for OS services 
P8 Telecoms service provider Architecting mobile phone services 
P9 Bank Analysis, design and implementing changes to web-based services 
P10 Secure app technology provider Architecting and promoting app technologies 
P11 Operating system supplier Designing and promoting security enhancements 
P12 Bespoke app developer Developing apps for business clients 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the experts interviewed. For each, 
we have given an indication of the nature of the companies they 
are currently involved with and their typical role. Some were 
contractors working for more than one organization; for them this 
shows the organization they work with most. All had more than 
20 years’ experience in software development. All were currently 
working in some way with secure app development; all but P1 had 
at least 5 years’ experience working with secure software 
development; and all but P5 and P8 had backgrounds as a 
software developer. Probably typically of their roles in this 
industry, all were male. 
Some of the interview questions related to the experts’ analysis of 
how to achieve secure app development; others to their own 
history and ways of learning about secure app development. Thus 
we can distinguish two forms of information from the interviews: 
information about how the app security experts had achieved their 
expertise and kept themselves updated, and information they had 
about best learning approaches for those working with them. 
In this paper we quote extensively from the interviews. To convey 
correctly the context and protect the confidentiality of the 
interviewees, we’ve amended the quotations appropriately; square 
brackets show additions and replacements; ellipses show 
removals. 
4. RESEARCH MODEL 
We observed that the experts differed widely in their original 
reasons for learning about software security. And there was 
correspondingly little agreement on how best to motivate app 
programmers generally to produce good secure apps.  
Our analysis of the interviews highlighted four forces motivating 
a programmer to learn and act on software security, as illustrated 




Figure 1: Motivation forces on a programmer 
These forces are: 
Knowledge the knowledge and skills that the programmers 
have learned in the past or gained through 
experience on how to deal with software security 
issues. 
Tasks the formal and informal assignments of code to 
write, changes to make, training, and related work 
that the programmer has as their overt job. 
Worries the concerns and fears the programmer has about 
what they are doing. 
Enthusiasms the positive inspirations that motivate the 
programmer to make specific choices. 
We found a tension between these as two pairs of alternatives: 
those who saw knowledge as a motivation didn’t feel the need for 
tasks and vice versa; those who felt worries were a motivation 
didn’t consider enthusiasm and vice versa.  
So where an expert’s interview expressed a position on these 
forces, we express that position as a location on each scale. For 
example, an expert who expressed strong views that security 
should be part of every relevant activity in software development 
would be represented at the ‘knowledge’ end of the scale; an 
expert who mildly suggested that security could be included as the 
tasks of penetration testing and app hardening would place 
towards the ‘tasks’ end of the scale.  
We found similar tensions between approaches to different views 
on implementing security and on the role of teamwork. These 
tensions we also represented on appropriate scales. 
Thus in diagrams in the following sections 5 and 6 we position the 
views or information expressed by experts on specific topics 
against axes representing two related scales. Each diagram shows 
only the experts who expressed a clear opinion, and shows 
clusters where several shared roughly the same position. The 
resulting pattern highlights the range of views expressed. 
5. REASONS FOR LEARNING 
5.1 Experts’ reasons for learning 
Thus Figure 2 expresses the original motivations for the experts 
















Figure 2: Reasons for original learning 
As it shows, these varied significantly. Most had learned from 
day-to-day experience, given enthusiasm for the security aspects 
of that experience; some had started as hackers: 
“Actually when I was a kid – fortunately, I never released any of 
this stuff – I did actually take copy protection off games for the 
intellectual challenge of this” (P3) 
Others had started on projects which required security:  
“[While at college] I had three very fun summers working on top 
secret projects and things like that, which had a fair amount of 
security in it.” (P12) 
“I did a lot of firmware work on a magnetic stripe card reader ... 
that had a number of security features… I definitely got the 
[security] bug there”. (P4) 
Only P1 had decided to learn about software security as a career 
decision – to build experience and credibility in a new area. 
5.2 Experts’ reasons for continued learning  
We also analyzed experts’ reasons for continued learning. Here 
we have more consistency; for most it’s an out-of-band task in 
addition to their normal day job, and they do it on an ad-hoc basis. 
Only P3 and P11, who work for a global, security aware, 
company, receive security-related training; and P1, in his role as 
author, assigns app security learning as part of his normal work” 
Most kept up to date through a background task of following 
appropriate internet media – Bruce Schneier’s update email was 
the most commonly mentioned medium (P3, P7, P8), or:  
“My work screen has a Twitter feed just running up the right hand 
side. Whenever I get to enough of a break that I can glance over 
I'll take a look at whatever is currently up there.” (P7) 
“I listen to a few podcasts… Security Now… with Steve Gibson on 
the TWiT Network” (P12) 
Figure 3 shows the experts’ reasons for their continued learning, 












Figure 3: Motivation for continued learning 
5.3 Motivating programmers to learn 
All the interviewees who discussed the point stressed that 
programmers had a tendency to avoid security issues and 
concentrate on delivering functionality. Some highlighted that few 
undergraduate level computing courses incorporate security into 
normal examples and practice.  
“So for the majority of people who are currently going through 
various computer science degrees, security doesn't really come 
into it at all, in any real context”. (P10) 
Many correlated general life experience, software development 
experience, and especially formal software development 
experience with ability at software security. Those who discussed 
it stressed the difficulty in motivating inexperienced developers: 
“When I'm talking to 22 year old phenomenally brilliant 
mathematician software developer who has got almost no life 
experience at all – how do I make him care about things that seem 
unimportant to him?” (P5) 
However the interviewees showed little consistency in their 
approaches to solving this problem and motivating programmers 
to work on security, as follows.  
5.3.1 Enthusiasm or worry? 
Some wanted security as an enthusiasm, wanting programmers to 
be passionate about doing a good job on security: 
“trying to talk to my developers about this and trying to come up 
with techniques that make them think about it in a way that makes 
them care about it” (P5) 
Others felt it should be a worry, where the impact of poor security 
is a threat to the programmers: 
“We’ll need a mass security event [caused by a mobile app] to get 
programmers to take app security seriously” (P1) 
5.3.2 Knowledge or task-based? 
Some represented making systems secure as part of a process, 
where developers do the right thing because they are expert and 
knowledgeable: 
“So you are going to have to get developers to understand 
computer science, and the consequences of the code they are 
writing” (P6) 
Others saw the adding of and planning of security as part of the 
functionality requirements and thus as a specific task.  
“Mine is much more practical. I need it to work, I'll put something 
together that actually does the job, and I will learn whatever I 
need to learn to do that. And then move on, if necessary.” (P4) 
We observe that these external motivators for programmers 
naturally follow the same axes as the motivators the experts had 
had for their own learning. Figure 4 shows how the experts who 











Figure 4: Opinions on how to motivate app programmers 
6. IMPLEMENTING SECURITY 
We also saw differences in how the experts suggested achieving 
app security. 
6.1 Approach to teamwork on security 
There were differences in how they viewed team interaction and 
their roles. 
6.1.1 Teamwork vs individual rigor 
Some stress communication between and within teams: 
“And I think one thing that we were incredibly good at with [a 
specific project], is bringing the entire project team together 
probably with the aid of, as well as the formal meetings, some of 
the more casual discussions over a beer. And so everybody fully 
understood the scope of what everyone was bringing to the table 
and there was never any of the artificial formalities that 
sometimes you can get around these projects where it feels 
uncomfortable to pick the phone up to somebody.” (P8)   
Others stressed individual rigor, as their primary tool. For 
example:  
“I tend to look at things in a stepwise way. Certainly when you’re 
evolving software, you don’t necessarily have formal proof but 
you can go in sufficiently simple steps that you can see that it’s 
obviously correct.” (P12)   
We saw the latter view expressed usually related to single 
developer situations where there weren’t others with whom to 
discuss security. 
6.1.2 Influencing vs directing 
Another distinction that emerged is that some saw their best 
means for they themselves to influence the team members as 
directive, exerting authority:  
“I had success [by] whacking them over the head with a wet fish” 
(P7, speaking metaphorically).  
Whilst others saw their role as influencing, questioning and 
encouraging:  
“[I] throw out a few 'what ifs' you know, what if I did that, and 
get somebody who is aware and will have an understanding of 
what you are suggesting, and they will counter with a sensible 
response.” (P8).  
















Figure 5: Expectation of team interaction 
Though one might expect the choice of influencing vs directing to 
reflect the expert’s authority in the organization, in fact this was 
not necessarily the case. For example P5’s role gave him authority 
and P7 was referring to peers. 
6.2 Approach to security 
In terms of knowledge transfer and implementing app security 
there were also differences between experts. These were more 
nuanced, reflecting differences in emphasis.  
6.2.1 Checklists or whole system security? 
Some experts preferred a checklist, excellent-coding attitude to 
security: 
“Checklists I think are wonderful things. And if they are Why, 
How, What, Where, When, not just 'does it' – it's not just a 'yes / 
no'. It’s a checklist that goes, in what way have you done this?” 
(P5) 
Others stressed the importance of various aspects of Whole 
System security: 
“I would just wish that education was better and that developers 
understood about separation of code and data and Saltzer and 
Schroeder’s 8 principles of computer security, and understood the 
background more and focussed less on the top 10 vulnerabilities – 
what they happen to be this year.” (P6) 
6.2.2 Concentrate on attacker or stakeholder? 
There was an interesting distinction as to whether the emphasis 
was more on attackers, or on stakeholders such as product 
managers. Some emphasized the importance of understanding and 
reacting to different kinds of attackers: 
“You also try and understand why someone is coming to your 
service in the first place. And try to give them what they want up 
front, so they lose interest and go away.” (P9) 
“I think it is actually very important to understand the motivations 
behind why somebody is hacking the system. We try to address the 
motivations of the attackers, versus the technical aspects - just 
locking it down for the sake of locking it down.” (P11) 
Others emphasized the importance of negotiation with 
stakeholders on what security was put in the product: 
[When I started] a project I’d go back and ask [my 
customer]…‘You do realize this [information] can be seen’. It 
goes from there: ‘how secure do you want it to be?’ You have to 
show that there’s a problem first I think” (P1) 















Figure 6: Preferred approach to app security 
7. WHAT TO LEARN 
Our purpose in the research was to work towards helping app 
developers in future. To work towards a practical positive output 
we looked therefore for development techniques that lead to good 
app security. There was no clear consensus, but we did identify a 
range of approaches each championed by at least one of the 
interviewees, and each rejected by none. Thus we synthesized 
agreement on important things for app programmers to learn. 
Many of our interviewees were clear that app programming 
techniques and choices alone wouldn’t be sufficient. So they take 
as a given approaches such as the OWASP lists and penetration 
testing, and they build on that. 
“We said 'right – these checklist things don't work, because 
products are too different, and so on, actually what we are 
looking at is more…’ – and to be fair, these days, you would call 
them architecture patterns rather than design patterns because 
they are at a higher level than typical design patterns.” (P6) 
This section explores some of the ‘best practice points’ raised in 
the interviews. They’re grouped under four categories: analysis, 
dialectic development, continuous feedback, and continuous 
enhancement. 
7.1 Analysis  
Analysis covers the programmer involvement in work outside the 
main design and coding of their apps. In some projects this will be 
upfront work; in agile projects it is likely to continue throughout 
the development life-cycle.  
Important features of analysis include agreement on the level of 
security and the processes involved: 
“It depends on the client, how much money they’ve got, how much 
time they want, how much time they’ve got to get to market. And 
you have to compromise all the processes, how you do it, and the 
degree to which you do it based on them. There is no One Way. 
It’s the same with security.” (P1) 
To that, they added security-aware choices of libraries and 
environments; ideation sessions working with stakeholders and 
penetration testing experts of different possible exploits on the 
system; and formal or informal risk assessments of the likelihood 
of each exploit and its possible impact. 
“One of the things I like to do with the [penetration testing] guys 
is to, if you sit down and say 'what are all the different ways you 
could subvert this system'.  It is quite common to come up with 20, 
30, 40, 50 in five or ten minutes of brainstorming. I bet you, you 
wouldn't think of half of them.” (P2)  
7.2 Dialectic development 
‘Dialectic’ means the finding out of knowledge through one 
person questioning another. Because of the adversarial nature of 
security, many of the most effective techniques for finding 
security issues are dialectic. Some of the techniques 
recommended were penetration testing, code reviews, pair 
programming, and a variety of code analysis tools. 
“I think the one [approach] that has been, arguably, most useful 
has been using specialist external consultancy around security. 
Not for training, but ‘can you just come in and penetration test 
this device’” (P2) 
“Nothing gets submitted without it being reviewed by at least 
another engineer. And there are strong processes to protect that 
fact. … The most successful technique has to be review by [a 
security] expert – you can't really beat that – an actual 
conversational review by an expert, because someone who is an 
expert in security might not be an expert in the domain.”  (P3) 
“[The most successful technique I have found is] to use various 
types of Lint checkers” (P7) 
7.3 Continuous feedback 
Many interviewees stressed the interactive nature of defending 
apps. In order to deal with new exploits and analyze existing ones, 
developers need access to information about what is happening to 
the deployed apps. 
This is more difficult with apps than with in-house or cloud-based 
systems, since apps are deployed remotely and may not have 
continuous communication with any central point. App developers 
typically need to put in extra functionality and have support 
processes to ensure they receive feedback. These range from 
delayed logging back to a central server: 
I’ve built quite a bit into the apps where they have their own 
debug logs because I don’t trust the likes of Google because they 
have to sanitize what they give you because they’ve got privacy 
issues on their side of things. (P12) 
to offering bounty for people who report possible weaknesses: 
“We pay people to report bugs to us” (P11) 
Based on this feedback programmers can analyze new security 
issues and plan fixes into the development stream for the future. 
7.4 Continuous enhancement 
The interviewees also stated that software needs to continue to 
change throughout its lifetime in order to remain sufficiently 
secure. New exploits, improved processing power, and wider 
publication of existing exploits all mean that what might have 
been secure a year ago may not be now. 
“Security is a process and update rates are an important part of 
that process” (P3) 
Two aspects make this particularly difficult for apps. First, the 
process of upgrading an app’s code is difficult. It usually requires 
a new release via an ‘App Store’, whether for a mobile app or a 
new OS version; but many users may choose not to upgrade.  
“The moment you release something to [a mobile phone OS], you 
will, in general, never get a 100% update rate, because loads of 
people [install] software once and never update.” (P3) 
So developers of mobile apps need to consider whether 
functionality is required to work around this.  
Second is the nature of app development ‘contracts’, whether 
internal to a company or commercial external contracts. In many 
cases app development is seen as ‘fire and forget’; on completion 
of the initial app development phase, the team is allocated to 
different projects.  
“Like many things that get delivered in a project, the project ends 
and interest dies with it. Unfortunately. And I think you lead into a 
significant challenge in securing things on an operational basis”. 
(P8) 
Secure app development therefore requires a different, continued 
development, approach to support sufficient security maintenance. 
8. WHAT NEXT? 
We observed in section 7 a lack of consistent emphasis on 
different secure app development techniques, and we observed in 
section 5 notable differences of opinion on how to motivate 
programmers to security, as highlighted by the spread of the 
points in Figure 4. Section 6 showed even stronger contrasts in 
experts’ approaches to teamwork in Figure 5, and their approaches 
to app security in Figure 6.  
The authors had experienced a similar lack of consistency in the 
early days of both the object oriented design paradigm (OOD) and 
the Agile development paradigm, each of which in due course 
converged into well accepted approaches: around UML and 
Scrum respectively. In the early days of each there were many 
good ideas and many experts championing different aspects of 
those ideas; the current situation in secure app development has a 
similar character. This suggests that the discipline of app 
development security is still at an early stage. 
The convergence around UML and Scrum led to greatly increased 
programmer acceptance and knowledge of OOD and Agile 
development respectively. We suggest that similar convergence in 
app development security will lead to greatly improved 
programmer knowledge in that area. Looking at the history of 
object oriented design and agile development we believe two 
steps are likely to lead to this convergence. First is the 
codification of the main principles by well-respected experts in a 
popular form: a book, online resource, or even video. Second is 
the championing of that codification by one or more large 
commercial organizations. Microsoft and Google are likely 
contenders, but both are tainted by their commitments to specific 
mobile platforms so it remains to be seen which organization may 
champion a global approach. 
9. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have highlighted the risks associated with app 
security, and identified the importance of ensuring programmer 
motivation to program apps securely and of improving their skills 
at doing so. 
From our research we showed in Section 5 that there is little 
similarity in people’s motivation to learn software security, nor 
consensus on how to motivate app developers to do so. Section 6 
showed diverging opinions on the use of teamwork and on the 
best approach to implementing security. And Section 7 
highlighted valuable ‘whole system security’ approaches to apply 
to app development despite a lack of industry-wide consensus on 
them. 
The lack of agreement is a significant challenge to improving the 
skills of app programmers, and Section 8 highlighted the 
importance of working towards an industry-wide consensus based 
on research.  
Thus future research is needed to explore objectively the most 
effective ways to motivate app developers in different contexts to 
learn and use secure development practices. And research is 
required to clarify the best security practices in different app 
development contexts and to discover the most effective ways for 
programmers to learn them. 
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